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Abstract  
 Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging 
than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the 
former. Yet the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey 
since 2002. Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength 
of the AKP government? Reliance on economic performance alone to gain public 
support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This study 
includes time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and 
demonstrates that even among Turkey’s long-lasting governments, the AKP has 
particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by economic 
performance. 
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Introduction 
 
Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging 
than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the 
former (Molina 2001, Uppal 2009; Pacek and Radcliff 1995). The pro-Islamic Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. That this single-party 
government has won two consecutive general elections and entered a third term poses a 
stark contrast with the short-lived coalition governments of the 1990’s. It has broken 
Turkey’s record of the hitherto longest serving government, the Democrat Party of the 
period 1950-1960. The source of such longevity is of great interest not only for Turkey 
but for emerging democracies in general. This paper examines the economic and 
non-economic reasons for voting for the AKP. 
The economic performance of the AKP government has been highly applauded 
both at home and abroad, but scholars also argue that the AKP government has carried 
out reforms that were of advantage for the masses (Yavuz 2006; 2009; Özbudun 2007; 
Hale and Özbudun 2010). From 2003, it has established policies that address serious 
problems for the general public such as the provision of collective housing for 
lower-income households, the equalizing integration of three pension systems that had 
privileged public servants, and the introduction of a universal health care system. Most 
recent data shows that the satisfaction of Turkish citizens with government services has 
been increasing since the establishment of the AKP government (Figure 1), and that its 
governance has been an improvement over previous governments (Figure 2).  
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Figure 1. Satisfaction with Public Services in Turkey: 2003-2010 
 
Source: TÜİK (2011b). 
Note: This graph uses the un-weighted mean percentage of “Satisfied” out of “Satisfied,” 
“In-between,” and “Unsatisfied” responses for pensions, medication, education, justice, 
and security. Results are from the Life Satisfaction Research (Yaşam Memnuniyeti 
Araştırması) that encompassed about 7000 Turkish citizens. 
 
Figure 2. Governance in Turkey: 1996-2009 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011).  
Note: This graph uses the un-weighted mean of six governance indicators (Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule 
of Law, and Control of Corruption). 
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Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength of the 
AKP government, or is there a non-economic variable that makes the AKP government 
more popular than previous governments? Reliance on economic performance alone for 
public support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations; this is often 
the case for emerging democracies. Non-economic reasons for voting for the incumbent 
party would seem to guarantee more stable popular support. The current analysis is 
based on time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and parses 
incumbent support into economic and non-economic variables to show that the AKP 
government’s electoral strength lies in both economic and non-economic variables.  
This paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a brief review of 
literature on economic voting to lay the groundwork for analyzing an emerging 
democracy such as Turkey. The Research Design Section provides discussion of the data 
and estimation model. The Results Section demonstrates that among four governments 
that have been re-elected in Turkey, only the AKP’s change in vote percentages can be 
attributed to both economic (per capita real GDP growth) and non-economic (AKP 
dummy) variables. Change in support for the other three governments can be associated 
only with the economic variable. The Conclusion provides interpretation of these 
findings and discussion of their implications. 
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Determinants of Incumbent Support in Emerging Democracies  
 
The literature on economic voting shows that three major variables account for 
voter support for incumbents, but analysis of emerging democracies requires that 
adjustments be made to reflect their economic and political instability. First, economic 
conditions prior to election must be considered. Studies on advanced democracies have 
used macro-economic indicators within the preceding year of the election. Yet in 
emerging democracies, where the economy is more turbulent, the memory of an 
economic crisis that has occurred more than a year before cannot be easily erased, and 
high economic growth is often a result of recovery from a previous economic downturn.  
For Latin American countries that experienced recurrent economic crises during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s, change in incumbent support was positively related to economic 
growth during the previous two years of the election (Remmer 1991; Benton 2005) but 
not to economic growth one year prior to the election (Remmer 1991). Quinn and 
Woolley’s (2001) finding that volatile economic growth decreases vote percentage for 
the incumbent also suggests that voters are not simply fooled by high economic growth 
at election time. Because Turkey’s economic growth rate has been highly erratic (Figure 
3), it is more appropriate (as in Latin American cases) to use the economic growth rate 
during the previous two years, rather than one year, before the election.1 
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Figure 3. GDP Growth Rate (%) in the Last and Second-to-Last Year before the Election:  
Turkey, 1950-2011 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix 1. 
 
Second, the longer a party is in government, the larger the decline in incumbent 
support. Long incumbency appears to bore the electorate and/or increase the likelihood 
of policy errors. This tendency, called the cost of ruling, applies to a large number of 
countries (Nannestad and Paldam 2002). The incumbency period is usually measured by 
months (or years) between two consecutive elections. Yet, what has been neglected is 
the possibility that a change in prime minister during the incumbency period may lift (or 
mitigate the decline in) incumbent support.  
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In general, a change in prime minister is regarded as change of government even if 
the incumbent party (or parties) remains the same. In addition, party leaders in Turkey 
have particularly strong control over their parties even when compared with political 
parties in Southern European countries where democratic experience is relatively short 
(Bosco and Morlino 2007). This means that the prime minister, the incumbent party’s 
leader, has significant power in government. For these reasons, if the prime minister 
changes during incumbency, the incumbency period can be adjusted so that it starts at 
the time of premier change rather than at the previous election.  
Third, voters punish single-party governments more severely than coalition 
governments. This is because the former seems to make it more clear who is to blame 
for policy failure (clarity of responsibility) than the latter (Powell and Whitten 1993; 
Whitten and Palmer 1999; Anderson 2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Fisher 
and Hobolt 2010). However, for emerging democracies, few empirical studies exist, and 
among those that do address this issue, there is evidence that the clarity of responsibility 
hypothesis does not apply (Vowels 2010; Roberts 2008).2 In fact, chronic political 
instability in emerging democracies, often governed by unstable coalition governments, 
may lead voters to support the current single-party government rather than voting for 
the most favorable party whose chances of securing a legislative majority are uncertain. 
If concern for stability is strong, it may cancel out the effect of clarity of responsibility.  
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Research Design 
 
The hypothesis of this paper is that economic performance does not sufficiently 
account for strong electoral support for the AKP government when compared with other 
governments in Turkey. There are relatively few empirical studies on economic voting 
behavior in Turkey, but Akarca and Tansel (2006) provide the most systematic 
time-series analysis. The aim of this paper is to compare the AKP government with 
other re-elected governments based on a simpler model.3  
 
Data 
   In Turkey, competitive elections have been held since 1950, although there have 
been three military interventions (1960-61, 1971-73, 1980-83) that disrupted the 
institutionalization of the party system and cycle of regular elections. Data sources 
include election data from the Turkish Statistical Office (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu or 
TÜİK) and economic data from the Central Bank of the Turkish Republic (Türkiye 
Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası or TCMB).  
There are 23 data points for lower house (general) elections, upper house (senate) 
elections, and general local elections. The upper house existed between 1961 and 1980. 
Since upper house elections were held for one-third of the seats and vacant seats, only 
when the preceding or following election was a lower house election, it is possible to 
calculate change in vote percentage by comparing the vote percentages in lower and 
upper house elections for only those constituencies where the upper house election was 
held.4 Thus, only two upper house elections that met the above condition were included 
in the sample. For general local elections, change in vote percentage in the Provincial 
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General Council (İl Genel Meclisi) was used because it represents national trends 
according to the convention in Turkey (Çarkoğlu 1997; Akarca and Tansel 2006). All 
by-elections for the lower or upper house as well as for local governments were 
excluded. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was vote swing (S) or change in vote percentage between 
two consecutive elections (Vt-Vt-1), for the incumbent party/parties.5 Also in terms of 
time series analysis, it was appropriate to use the vote swing instead of the vote because 
the latter displays a sign of strong serial correlation (Figure 4). The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit-root test that included an intercept and a linear trend resulted in a 
failure to reject the null hypothesis that the incumbent vote was stationary at the 0.05 
level of statistical significance (t=-3.53, p= 0.06, N=22).  
 
Figure 4. Aggregate Vote Percentage for Incumbent Parties: Turkey, 1950-2011 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix 1. 
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Independent variables 
First, the two-year mean per capita real GDP change prior to the election (G) was 
defined as (Gt+Gt-1)/2. If the election were held in the n-th month of the year t, then  
 
Gt = per capita real GDP percentage change in the year t × n/12 + per capita real GDP 
percentage change in the year t-1× (12-n)/12 
 
Gt-1 = per capita real GDP percentage change in the year t-1 × n/12 + per capita real 
GDP percentage change in the year t-2× (12-n)/12 
 
Second, the variable for the incumbency period (D) was defined as the number of 
months (1) between two consecutive elections (of any type of legislature) if the major 
incumbent party does not change, (2) between the inauguration of the successive 
government and the nearest following election (of any type of legislature) if the major 
incumbent party has changed, and (3) between the inauguration of the new prime 
minister and the nearest following election if the prime minister has changed while the 
largest incumbent party remains the same. If the government is in coalition, the 
incumbency period is weighted by the share of the prime minister’s party in 
parliamentary seats.  
   Third, the coalition variable (C) was a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for 
coalition and 0 for single-party government.  
Fourth, the inclusion of different types of elections in the time series requires 
control for the effect of election type on voter tendency to blame the incumbent. In 
second-order elections (or non-general elections), which do not directly bring about 
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change of government, even voters who prefer the continuation of the current 
government may express warnings or protest by not voting for the incumbent party. 
There is evidence from Germany, the United States, Canada, and England that parties in 
the national government lose votes in sub-national elections (Kedar 2006), especially if 
they also control the sub-national government (Rodden and Wibbels 2011; Boyne et al. 
2009).6 The more severe punishment of the incumbent in second-order elections has 
been interpreted in the literature as voter behavior of moderation or balancing. Akarca 
and Tansel (2006) reported that in Turkey parties in the national government received 
weaker support in local (but not in upper house) than in lower house elections.  
The warning effect by reluctant supporters of the incumbent was controlled for by 
a warning variable (W) that gives different weights to different combinations of election 
types found in any two consecutive elections. Adopting the method of Akarca and 
Tansel (2006), the warning variable took: (1) a value of 1 when a local election followed 
a lower or upper house election, (2) a value of 0 when both consecutive elections were 
local elections or lower (or upper) house elections, and (3) a value of -1 when a local 
election preceded a lower or upper house election.7  
Fifth, the AKP variable (AKP) was a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
election was run under the AKP government and 0 under other incumbent parties. There 
have been three re-elected (same time single-party) governments other than the AKP 
government: the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti (DP), 1950-60), the Justice Party 
(Adalet Partisi (AP), 1965-71), and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi (ANAP), 
1983-91). All of these were oriented toward the center-right. Because these re-elected 
single-party governments may also have had particular strength, separate dummy 
variables DP, AP, ANAP were assigned for them. 
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Model 
The current analysis used the following time-series regression model as the base 
model (Model 1):  
 
S = b0 + b1G + b2D + b3C + b4W + e (Model 1) 
 
where S is the swing, or change in the incumbent vote percentage between two 
consecutive elections, b0 is the intercept, G is the two-year mean per capita real GDP 
change in percentage during two years prior to the election, D is the incumbency period 
in terms of months, C is the coalition government dummy, W is the warning effect of 
general local elections, b1 through b4 are multiple regression coefficients, and e is the 
error term. 
 
Model 2 adds to Model 1 the AKP dummy variable that measures the electoral 
strength particular to the AKP government. 
  
 S = b0 + b1G + b2D + b3C + b4W + b5AKP + e (Model 2) 
 
Alternatively, Model 3, Model 4, and Model 5 replace the AKP variable with the 
DP, AP, and ANAP variables respectively. 
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Results 
 
 
Table 1 shows the results of time-series regressions of the base model (Model 1), 
the AKP model (Model 2), and three other single-party government models (Model 3 
though Model 5). First, as expected, the results of Model 1 demonstrate that three out of 
the four independent variables exert significant effects on vote swing. The incumbent 
loss of vote appears to be larger to the extent that (1) the two-year mean per capita real 
GDP growth prior to the election is lower, (2) the incumbency period is longer, and (3) 
the previous election is a lower or upper house election and the current election is a 
general local election. Although the coalition variable was not statistically significant, 
this finding is consistent with evidence for emerging democracies (Vowels 2010; 
Roberts 2008). Specifically, when the two obvious contextual variables, incumbency 
period and election type, are controlled, economic performance determines change in 
incumbent support in Turkey. 
 
Table 1 Determinants of Incumbent Vote Swing, 1950-2011 (N=23) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Economic Growth(G) 2.79*** 2.70*** 2.71*** 2.61*** 2.76*** 
 (0.62)    (0.58)    (0.65)    (0.66)    (0.60)    
 
 
 
   
Incumbency Period(D) -0.36*** -0.34*** -0.40*** -0.35*** -0.40*** 
 (0.11)    (0.10)    (0.12)    (0.11)    (0.11)    
 
 
 
   
Coalition(C) -2.59    -0.77    -2.33    -3.14    -4.30    
 (3.14)    (3.06)    (3.22)    (3.21)    (3.26)    
 
 
 
   
Warning(W) -4.51**  -4.58**  -4.61**  -4.42**  -4.49**  
13 
 
 (1.82)    (1.70)    (1.86)    (1.83)    (1.77)    
 
 
 
   
AKP(AKP) 
 
7.13*   
   
 
 
(3.67)    
   
 
 
 
   
DP(DP) 
 
 3.61    
  
 
 
 (6.02)    
  
 
 
 
   
AP(AP) 
 
 
 
-3.57    
 
 
 
 
 
(3.93)    
 
 
 
 
   
ANAP(ANAP) 
 
 
  
-5.75    
 
 
 
  
(3.95)    
 
 
 
   
Intercept -2.65  -5.60  -1.98  -1.60  0.28  
 (-0.71) (-1.57) (-0.51) (-0.41) (0.07) 
 
 
 
   
Adjusted R2 0.60  0.65  0.59  0.60  0.62 
Durbin-Watson Stat. 1.61 1.94 1.55 1.54 1.71 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Notes: The dependent variable is change in the percentage of the incumbent vote 
between two consecutive elections. Entries are multiple regression coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Does this economic performance sufficiently account for the vote swing for the 
AKP? The results of Model 2 indicate that it does not. Even though economic 
performance is part of the explanation, a sizable part of the residual in Model 1 can be 
accounted for by the AKP variable. Estimated multiple regression coefficients indicate 
the following: (1) a one-percentage point increase in the two-year mean per capita real 
GDP growth rate appears to increase the vote swing for any incumbent by 2.70 
percentage points, and (2) if the incumbent is the AKP, the vote swing is 7.13 
percentage points greater than if the incumbent is not the AKP. The adjusted R2 value 
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which measures the overall fit of the model increased from 0.60 for Model 1 to 0.65 for 
Model 2.  
The above indications are graphically presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6 that 
correspond to Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. Figure 5 reveals a linear relationship 
between economic growth and incumbent vote swing when incumbency period, 
coalition, and warning are controlled. The regression line indicates positive impact of 
economic growth on vote swing, but the vote swing for the AKP is always 
overestimated (or estimated with positive errors). In other words, even when other 
independent variables are controlled, variation in economic growth cannot sufficiently 
account for the AKP’s vote swing. Figure 6 shows the same relationship when the AKP 
dummy variable is added to the three control variables mentioned above. The regression 
line is a better fit to data points than in the previous figure, and the vote swing for the 
AKP government is also estimated with smaller error and bias. 
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Figure 5. Model 1: Without AKP Dummy 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the results of Model 1 in Table 1.. 
Notes: The Y axis shows the vote swing for the incumbent when independent variables 
other than economic growth rate are controlled (S｜X). The X axis shows the economic 
growth rate when the other independent variables are controlled (G｜X). Years indicate 
election years, and those circled were held under AKP incumbency. 
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Figure 6. Model 2: With AKP Dummy 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the results of Model 2 in Table1..  
Note: See Figure 5. 
 
 
The three re-elected single party governments other than the AKP were also tested 
for their strength associated with non-economic performance in Models 3, 4, and 5 in 
the same way as in Model 2. Results show that none of the incumbent dummy variables 
(DP, AP, and ANAP) were statistically significant. The finding that only the AKP 
variable had a significantly positive regression coefficient indicates that among the 
long-serving governments, only the AKP government has had particularly strong 
political support that cannot be accounted for by economic performance (and other 
obvious contextual variables) alone. In other words, the AKP’s electoral strength defies 
conventional explanation. 
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Conclusions 
 
The most pressing agenda for an incumbent party in an upcoming election is how 
to minimize decline in its vote. The AKP government has been far more successful than 
previous Turkish governments in retaining its electoral support. Results reported in this 
paper demonstrate that even among Turkey’s long-serving governments, the AKP 
government has particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by 
economic performance (and other obvious contextual variables such as incumbency 
period, clarity of responsibility, and type of election). If economic growth is a good but 
not sufficient predictor of incumbent support, the remaining explanation lies at least 
partly in income (re)distribution that benefits median voters or lower-income citizens.8 
The evidence is only suggestive but still congruent with recent arguments relative to 
Turkish politics that the AKP has carried out reforms that have addressed major interests 
of the masses. Further studies are needed to determine if and which (re)distributive 
policies have contributed to strong electoral support for the AKP government. 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 In developed economies, it is reasonable to use the economic growth rate in the 
previous year of the election alone (without the second-to-last year growth rate) as a 
measurement of economic performance. Their current economic growth rate is 
auto-correlated, thus reflecting its previous value (Hazama 2007, 108-109). 
2 Vowels (2010) demonstrated that while voters in advanced democracies hold the 
government with fewer parties more accountable than those with more parties, voters in 
emerging democracies have no such tendency. 
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3 The dependent variable in this research is change in support for the entire government 
(all incumbent parties), whereas the primary dependent variable for Akarca and Tansel 
(2006) was the level of support for the largest party in the government. Their results 
showed that both economic growth and inflation in the previous year of the election 
affected the vote for the largest incumbent party when many other contextual variables 
were controlled. Alternatively, when they used aggregate vote for all the incumbent 
parties as the dependent variable, economic growth did not have a significant effect.  
4 Change in the incumbent vote between lower and upper house elections was obtained 
as follows: First, the percentage of the total incumbent vote to total valid votes in the 
upper house election (which is held each time for one-third of the seats as well as vacant 
seats) was calculated. Second, the percentage of the total incumbent vote to total valid 
votes in the preceding (or following) general election, but only for the constituencies 
where the above senate election was held, was calculated. Third, the vote swing was 
obtained as the difference between the first and second (or second and first) results.  
5 If the government prior to the election was a care-taker government, then the vote 
swing of the previous incumbent party/parties was used. 
6 Japan’s long-term incumbent party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), received a 
consistently lower voter percentage in upper than in lower house elections (Reed and 
Brunk 1984, 59). 
7 When an alternative formulation of the warning variable that divided election type to 
general and non-general (local and upper house) was used in regressions, it showed a 
slightly weaker effect than the first formulation. 
8 For the role of (re)distributive policy in sustaining the popularity of the left-wing 
incumbent in Brazil, see Hunter and Power (2007) and Bohn (2011).  
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Appendix 1. Dataset for Time Series Analysis: 1950-2011 
Year Month Day Incumbent† Vt Vt-1 St Gt Gt-1 G D W C 
1950 5 14 CHP 39.9  53.9  -14.0  -2.4  7.1  2.4  45 0 0 
1954 2 5 DP 56.6  53.4  3.2  7.1  8.8  7.9  44 0 0 
1957 10 27 DP 47.3  56.6  -9.3  3.8  1.4  2.6  44 0 0 
1963* 11 17 CHP, CKMP, YTP 45.8  64.4  -18.6  6.7  3.3  5.0  25 1 1 
1965 10 10 CHP 28.7  36.2  -7.5  0.8  2.9  1.9  15d -1 0 
1968* 6 2 AP 49.1  52.9  -3.8  2.6  6.0  4.3  31 1 0 
1969 10 12 AP 46.5  49.1  -2.6  2.3  3.4  2.8  16 -1 0 
1973 10 14 APa 41.7  46.5  -4.8  2.5  1.7  2.1  17e 0 0 
1975** 10 12 AP, MSP, CGP, MHP 52.9  49.8  3.1  2.9  1.0  2.9  6f 0 1 
1977 6 5 AP, MSP, CGP, MHP 52.5  52.9  -0.4  4.3  4.8  4.6  19 0 1 
1979** 10 14 CHP, CGP, DkP 31.6  44.5  -12.9  -2.2  -0.5  -1.4  21g 0 1 
1984* 3 25 ANAP 41.5  45.1  -3.6  2.4  0.9  1.6  4 1 0 
1987 11 29 ANAP 36.3  41.5  -5.2  7.2  4.2  5.7  44 -1 0 
1989* 3 26 ANAP 21.8  36.3  -14.5  -0.7  5.5  2.4  15 1 0 
1991 10 20 ANAP 24.0  21.8  2.2  -0.2  5.6  2.7  3h -1 0 
1994* 3 27 DYP, SHPb 36.3  47.8  -11.5  2.7  4.9  3.8  9i 1 1 
1995 12 24 DYP, CHP 29.9  36.3  -6.4  6.1  -7.8  -0.9   20 -1 1 
1999 4 18 ANAP, DSP, DTPc 35.4  34.2  1.2  -0.9  6.6  2.8  21j 0 1 
2002 11 3 DSP, MHP, ANAP 14.7  53.4  -38.7  3.5  -9.0  -2.8  42 0 1 
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2004* 3 28 AKP 41.7  34.3  7.4  5.2  5.9  5.5  12k 1 0 
2007 7 22 AKP 46.6  41.7  4.9  4.4  5.7  5.1  39 -1 0 
2009* 3 29 AKP 38.4 46.6 -8.2 -2.0 2.4 0.2 20 1 0 
2011 6 12 AKP 49.8 38.4 11.5 7.9 0.7 4.3 14 -1 0 
Sources: Compiled by the author from DİE (various years), TÜİK (various years), TCMB (various years), and Tuncer (2003). 
Notes: Results of general elections.*General local elections. **Upper house (senate) elections.  
†AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. ANAP: Anavatan Partisi. AP: Adalet Partisi. CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. CKMP: Cumhuriyetçi 
Köylü Millet Partisi. DP: Demokrat Parti. DkP: Demokratik Parti. DSP: Demokratik Sol Parti. DTP: Demokrat Türkiye Partisi. DYP: 
Doğru Yol Partisi.CGP: Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi. MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. MP: Millet Partisi. SHP: Sosyal Demokratik 
Halkçı Parti. YTP: Yeni Türkiye Partisi. 
a The AP that governed between 1969 and 1971 was regarded as the incumbent. After the coup by memorandum on March 12, 1971, 
technocratic above-party governments ruled until the 1973 general election. The corresponding G was calculated beginning on March 12, 
1971. The AP vote in 1973 includes the vote for the DkP that split from the AP.  
b Includes the vote for the CHP that split from the SHP. 
c Because the DTP that split from the DYP did not exist at the time of the 1995 general election, its vote in the 1999 general election 
(0.6%) was excluded. 
d Resigned on February 20, 1965 after its budget bill was rejected by the parliament. The succession government was the 
AP-YTP-CKMP-MP coalition government, and this was excluded from analysis because it was a care-taker government (Ahmad 1977, 
225; Kara 2004, 100). 
e Resigned due to the coup by memorandum on March 12, 1971. 
f Inaugurated on March 31, 1975 following the resignation of the previous government. Because the incumbent changed less than two 
years before, the corresponding Gm was calculated as G, not as (G+G’)/2. 
g Inaugurated on January 5, 1978 following the resignation of the previous government. 
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h Inaugurated on June 23, 1991 with Mesut Yılmaz as Prime Minister after he was elected chairman of the ANAP. 
I Inaugurated on June 25, 1993 with Tansu Çiller as Prime Minister after she was elected chairman of the DYP. The DYP chairmanship 
had been vacated after Süleyman Demirel was elected President of the Republic. 
j Inaugurated on June 30, 1997 after the resignation of the previous government. 
k Inaugurated on March 14, 2003 with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Prime Minister after he replaced Abdullah Gül. 
